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On 8th December, Sayed 
Mohammed Jaffer, the captain of the 
Bahrain national football team, lifted 
aloft the Arabian Gulf Cup at Abdullah 
bin Khalifa stadium in Doha. The victory 
of his tiny island nation didn’t simply 
signal an unexpected triumph on the 
football field. It also represented a 
glimmer of hope for a diplomatic 
breakthrough. 
Less than a month earlier, 
Bahrain hadn’t even been expected to 
participate in the tournament — the bi-
annual highpoint on the region’s 
football calendar. The kingdom, along 
with Gulf neighbours Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, had announced that it would 
refuse to take part in the contest. 
The decision was the latest snub 
of Doha in a dispute that has run since 
June 2017, when Gulf neighbours 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
and Bahrain (along with Egypt) severed 
diplomatic relations with Qatar, closing 
their land border and airspace to Qatar. 
The blockading countries accused 
Qatar of supporting terrorism, a charge 
that Doha repeatedly denied. They set 
out a list of demands that Doha refused 
to meet.  
 
Sport and the blockade  
 
From the outset, sport has been 
caught up in the dispute. In October 
2017, a top UAE security official 
suggested that the only way for the 
blockade to end was for Qatar to give 
up on hosting the 2022 World Cup. A 
sophisticated piracy operation – 
bootlegging the content of Qatar-based 
sports broadcaster BeIN Sports – has 
been transmitted using satellite 
infrastructure owned by Arabsat, a 
Saudi-based communications 
company. The blockade affected the 
2017 edition of the Gulf Cup, which 
moved from Qatar to Kuwait after 
Saudi, UAE and Bahrain threatened to 
pull out.  
As this year’s tournament in 
Doha drew closer, the blockading 
nations were once again expected to 
boycott the event. In November, a draw 
took place to determine the matches 
between the five remaining countries of 
Oman, Yemen, Qatar, Iraq and Kuwait. 
Organisers worked on the basis that 
they were hosting a reduced-sized 
event, planning stadiums and tickets 
accordingly. I still have what I hope is 
now a collector’s edition ‘ticket guide’, 
produced in early November, outlining 
the five-team tournament. 
But on 13th November, just 11 
days before the tournament was due to 
start, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain 
had a sudden change of heart — and 
announced that they were willing to 
participate in the contest. The decision 
came after a visit by the Qatari foreign 
minister to Saudi Arabia. It arrived 
against a backdrop of talk of a wider 
thaw between the rival nations, 
following the attendance in May of 
Qatar’s Prime Minister at the GCC 
summit in Mecca and a meeting of all 
six GCC interior ministers in early 
November.  
Kristian Ulrichsen, Middle East 
fellow at Rice University’s Baker 
Institute for Public Policy, believes that 
other geopolitical developments in the 
region — including the recent hijacking 
of oil tankers and a major attack on 
Saudi oil facilities — concentrated 
minds among the region’s rulers. ‘The 
attacks on maritime traffic and oil 
facilities since May have refocused 
attention on real rather than 




manufactured threats to stability,’ he 
told the Bloomberg news agency. 
Kuwait, which has sat on the sidelines 
of the dispute, reportedly urged Saudi 
Arabia to take part in the tournament as 
a goodwill gesture.  
The Qatari organising committee 
swung into action. A new draw was 
held, a revised schedule published and 
preparations made for an eight-team 
event. On the eve of the tournament, 
the Saudi squad flew direct to Qatar 
from Riyadh, the first flight to do so in 
over two years. The UAE team chose to 
fly to Doha via Kuwaiti airspace, a 
gesture that led regional analysts to 
speculate that Qatar is closer to making 
up with Saudi than it is with UAE. 
 
On the field 
 
I attended the opening match 
between Qatar and Iraq, excited to see 
how the expanded tournament would 
work. There were no boos or jeers upon 
the unfurling of the Saudi, Emirati or 
Bahraini flags — something that 
surprised me, given my previous 
experience of the hyper-nationalist and 
partisan crowds in England, where I 
grew up, and in Turkey, where I have 
spent many years researching local 
football culture. “Everyone is welcome 
to Doha for the championship,” said the 
Qatari fan sat next to me. “All of our Gulf 
brothers. Even the blockading 
countries. We hope for an end, 
because we don’t like it like this”.  
The game started the 
tournament with a shock, as Iraq beat 
Qatar 2-1. The Iraqis in the crowd were 
very excited, waving flags, running up 
and down the stairwells and chanting 
loudly. The Qatari fans merely looked 
on with amusement.  
The following evening I joined a 
thinner crowd as Kuwait played Saudi 
Arabia. Whilst the Saudi football team 
had come to Doha, few fans had made 
the same journey – the land border with 
Qatar remained closed, leaving only the 
hardcore fans willing to make a seven-
hour flight via Kuwait, and a small 
number of Saudis already living in 
Qatar. Indeed, there were more 
Omanis in the crowd than Saudis – fans 
who had chosen to hang around after 
their side had played Yemen earlier in 
the evening. When Kuwait scored, they 
all jumped up and cheered loudly. ‘You 
want Kuwait to win?’ I asked one fan, 
sensing perhaps a geopolitical 
statement behind the celebration. ‘No,’ 
he cautioned me. ‘If Saudi score, you 
will see the same reaction!’  
The fan’s comment was a 
reminder that, by focusing only on 
government or state-level actions, 
social scientists can miss certain 
dynamics of cultural events. The 
Arabian Gulf Cup was not solely about 
geopolitical maneuvering. Dating back 
to 1970, the competition is a celebration 
of regionalism as much as a crucible of 
competition for Gulf nations. In the fans’ 
celebrations for any side that scored, 
we can glimpse another, more tacit 
political gesture – eschewing the 
narrative of disagreement propagated 
by governments for one of unity with ‘all 
of our Gulf brothers’.  
The group stages rattled along. 
Yemen were poor, Oman and Kuwait a 
bit unlucky. In the first-round 
showdown, Qatar beat the UAE to set 
up a semi-final clash with none other 
than Saudi Arabia.  
The tickets for the eagerly-
anticipated match vanished as soon as 
they went on sale. The online website 
ground to a halt. There were long lines 
in all the malls — populated in equal 
numbers by Qataris and expats. The 
game was a close-fought 1-0, Saudi 
Arabia defending tenaciously and Qatar 
unable to break them down, despite a 
plethora of chances. The Bahrain-
Saudi final was equally close, settled by 




a Mohamed Al Romaihi flick on a 
second-half counterattack. 
The Arabian Gulf Cup 
breakthrough has kindled new hope 
among both fans and football officials 
that the blockade will be over by the 
time of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. “The 
problem between the nations is from 
above,” one Saudi fan told a Qatari TV 
reporter a fortnight after the event. “The 
Qatari people are good. We are 
brothers”. I have heard similar 
sentiments about Saudi Arabia from 
Qatari fans. 
When it put itself forward in 
2010, Doha branded its bid for the first 
Middle East World Cup as a chance to 
bring the region closer together. The 
blockade had made that idea seem all 
but impossible.  But after the Gulf Cup 
thaw Qatari officials are stressing the 
ability of football to rebuild bridges.  
Hassan Al Thawadi, secretary 
general of the Supreme Committee for 
Development and Legacy, the 
organization tasked with organizing and 
running the 2022 FIFA World Cup, said 
that the Gulf Cup had “a special place 
in our hearts”. He added: “It 
showcases… the concept of building 
platforms that, despite differences, 
bring people together.” 
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